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P.: New Hope for the Defense--The Rule of Botta v. Brunner
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
NEw HoPE FoR

=HEDEFENSE-THE RuLE OF

Botta v. Brunner

In the trial of a personal injury action, it has heretofore been
the practice in this jurisdiction, and many others, for the court in
examining jurors upon their voir dire, to indicate the nature of the
action and the amount sued for; the subliminal effects of this
pronouncement are imponderable. Before the jury is sworn to try
the case, prior to the introduction of a particle of evidence, indeed,
before the actual trial of the case is initiated, the plaintiff has
struck the first blow; he has placed a dollar value for compensation upon his injuries, pain and suffering, and imported to the
entire panel of jurors, valuations which have no foundation in
evidence and are elements of sheer speculation on a loss which
by unanimity of opinion is not susceptible of evaluation on any
monetary basis.'
Recognizing the unfair advantage of this abuse, the esteemed
Supreme Court of New Jersey has recently held2 that it is improper
for counsel for the plaintiff in a personal injury action to: (1) By
mathematical formula suggest to the jury the amount it should
award per minute, hour or day, for conscious pain and suffering;
(2) employ blackboards or charts exhibiting to the jury calculations of specific amounts which in view of counsel should be
awarded for pain and suffering; (3) state in arguing the case
to the jury, the amount for which suit is brought. This has been
the rule in Pennsylvania since before the turn of the century. 3
In order to utilize the holding of Botta v. Brunner in West
Virginia trial courts, it is urged that at the pretrial conference, or
at the earliest possible moment, defense counsel should present
4
the following motions to the court:
I. That the amount sued for in this case be kept from the
jury throughout the trial and that, to this end:
(1) the court make no mention of this amount in
examining the jurors upon their voir dire;
(2) counsel for plaintiff be instructed to make no oral
mention of the amount sued for in any phase of
the trial;
1 National Fruit Products Co. v. Wagner, 185 Va. 38, 37 S.E.2d 757
(1946);
Roedder v. Rowley, 28 Cal. 2d 820, 172 P.2d 353 (1946).
2
Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 718 (1958).
3
Baker v. Pennsylvania Co., 142 Pa. 503, 21 Atl. 979 (1891); Joyce v.

Smith,
4 269 Pa. 439, 112 AUt. 549 (1921).
These motions were drafted by Stanley C. Morris, Esq., of the Kanawha
County Bar for use in personal injury litigation.
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(3) no mention of this amount be made in any written
instruction read to the jury; and
(4) the declaration in which this amount is stated be
not given to the jury to take to their jury room.
II. That plaintiff's counsel be instructed that no figures may
be placed upon a blackboard or be otherwise presented
to the jury whereby counsel's estimate of a proper amount
per hour, per day, or in gross, to be found by the jury for
plaintiff's suffering, be stated.
Certain superficial objections to these motions may be encountered upon submission of these motions to West Virginia trial
courts: first, that it is necessary to inform the jury in a wrongful
death case of the $20,000.00 ceiling for recoveries, imposed by the
legislature,5 and second, that the plaintiff's recovery is limited to
in excess
the amount laid in the declaration and that any amount
6
thereof cannot be reduced to a valid judgment.
These objections may be readily disposed of by suggesting to
the trial court that although the court is powerless in West Virginia to require a remittitur upon its own volition, the parties to
the action are not so inhibited. 7 If the jury returns an amount in
excess of the statutory limitation in wrongful death cases, or in
excess of the amount laid in the plaintiffs declaration, the plaintiff may preserve the validity of the award to the extent of the
permitted amounts and reduce that portion of the verdict to
judgment. In point of fact, with the inflated and exorbitant
amounts currently set out in ad damnum clauses by plaintiff's
lawyers, only an infinitesimal number of verdicts are now, or are
likely to be returned in excess of these enormous amounts sued for.
The fractional number of cases in which these problems are
likely to be encountered is indicative of the fact that these objections are of less than arrant severity.
An integral part of the art of advocacy and a legitimate area
of persuasion in any action or suit is to urge certain inferences and
conclusions based upon the evidence of the case, to the end that
the jury or court will adopt conclusions and resolve issues to the
advantage of the advocate's client. A more serious objection to the
5 W. VA. CoDE ch. 54, art. 7 § 6 (Michie 1955).
6 First National Bank v. Bank of Mannington, 76 W. Va. 356, 85 S.E. 541

(1915).
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rule of Botta v. Brunner is that the holding of the New Jersey
court is likely to deprive counsel of part of this area of permitted and legitimate persuasion-the opportunity to implore the
jury to return a verdict in the amount of the desired number of
dollars.
Even the most partisan plaintiff's counsel will readily perceive
and acknowledge that evidence of any correlation between pain
and dollars is totally absent in any personal injury action. There is
no fair market value for pain and suffering, or any replacement
value for a physical disability. The voluntary subjection of oneself
to pain would have no market value in precise monetary terms, for
no market exists where such malaise is purchased and sold. It is
futile, even absurd, to argue that a scientific or economic gage or
index may be employed to guide in the establishment of awards
for pain and suffering. 8 No expert opinion or any type or form of
evidence tending to estimate the money value of damages for pain
and suffering may be introduced by either party. 9 Argument not
based upon proof presented and received into evidence should not
be deemed within the permitted field of counsel's persuasion of the
0
jury.'
Therefore, the denial to plaintiff's counsel of the opportunity
to present his estimate of the monetary value of the injuries does
not inhibit the legitimate area of counsers argument based upon
evidence, but merely restrains an attempt to gain an unfair advantage by stating to the jury an amount claimed or expected which
tends to instill in the minds of jurors an impression not founded
upon a scintilla of evidence." The verdict of the jury and any
allowance for injuries in a personal injury case, should be a deduction by the jury based upon evidence confined to the merits of the
case and nature and extent of the injuries, and should not be the
adoption of the monetary estimates of counsel. Such estimates by
counsel are offered in lieu of evidence which is inadmissible. 12
These statements by counsel of his monetary estimate of damages,
not supported or based upon any evidence, can have the effect of
taking the place of evidence in the minds of jurors, who, not being
8 Jackson v. LaFollette Hardware & Lumber Co., 193 F.2d 647 (6th Cir.
1951);
25 C.J.S., Damages § 93.
9
Vaughan v. Magee, 218 Fed. 630 (3d Cir. 1936).
10 Clark v. Essex Wire Co., 361 Pa. 60, 68 A.2d 35 (1949); Stassum v.
Chaplin, 324 Pa. 125, 188 Ad. Ill (1936)
11 Bullock v. Chester & Darby Telford Road Co., 270 Pa. 295, 113 Ad.
379 (192:1).
12 Clark v. Essex Wire Co., supra.
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learned in the law, do not always make refined distinctions between mere argument and evidence. It is an "exceedingly bad
practice" because "it tends to get figures and amounts into the
3
minds of jurors without evidence."'
The critical concept to grasp, is the distinction between the
restraint of legitimate argument based upon evidence which urges
certain inferences and conclusions based thereon, and the opinions
of counsel not based upon any evidence. The only formula the
law provides for the determination of monetary damages for pain
and suffering is a fair and just compensation, and this determination may best be left to the enlightened conscience of jurors who
should be spared the intrusion of plaintiffs counsel into their
province.
The belief is widespread among laymen that personal injury
actions are initiated for sums in excess of the actual amounts expected; what lawyer would dispute this impression? If this is so,
when a hypothetical jury is informed by plaintiff's counsel that the
action is brought for $50,000.00, the jury may place a tentative
value of $25,000.00 or less upon the plaintiff's claim, knowing that
plaintiffs expect one half or less of the amount sued for. If, because of some question of contributory negligence or other consideration, the jury wishes to extend some sympathetic treatment
to the defendant, they may return a verdict of only $10,000.00 to
preserve the defendant from suffering the entire monetary consequences of the plaintiff's alleged loss. This "sympathetic treatment" may well be accorded a defendant in a case where a realistic
appraisal of the plaintiffs injuries, not permanent in nature, might
fairly lead to a valuation of less than $2,000.00. Our hypothetical
jury may be misled by an inordinate and exorbitant amount communicated to the jury by plaintiffs counsel, based only upon the
fanciful and capricious reflections of counsel.
We may only hope that the West Virginia court will condemn
this reprehensible practice which leads to the indefensible result of
verdicts based only upon an opinion of plaintiff's counsel.
R. G. P.

13

Reese v. Hershey, 163 Pa. 253, 255, 29 At. 907, 908 (1894).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol61/iss4/10

4

